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LAWYERS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS*
Paul Brest" and Linda Hamilton Krieger-
INTRODUCHON
A client with a problem consults a lawyer rather than, say, a psychologist,
investment counselor, or business advisor because he perceives the problem to
have a significant legal dimension. But few real world problems conform to the
boundaries that define and separate different professional disciplines. It is
therefore a rare client who wants his lawyer to confine herself strictly to "the
law." Rather, most clients expect their lawyers to integrate legal considerations
with other aspects of their problems. Solutions are often constrained or
facilitated by the law, but finding the best solution-a solution that addresses all
of the client's concerns-usually requires more than technical legal skill.
Thus, of the ten "fundamental lawyering skills" identified by the ABA's
MacCrate Commission Report, fewer than half relate exclusively to the law.1
And it is noteworthy that the Report places the skill of "problem solving" at the
very top of the list--even before legal analysis. In a recent survey of the partners
of American law firms, "problem solving" was reported as the single most
attractive aspect of the respondents' work.2 The primacy of problem solving
reflects how lawyers view themselves and would like to be viewed by others-
especially in the face of much popular rhetoric to the contrary.
We share this hopeful view of lawyers and the legal profession. At their
best, lawyers serve as society's general problem solvers, skilled in avoiding as
well as resolving disputes and in facilitating public and private ordering. They
help their clients solve problems flexibly and economically, not restricting
themselves to the cramped decision frames that "legal thinking" tends to impose
on a client's situation. Good lawyers bring more to bear on a problem than legal
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1. The law-related skills are, in the order listed by the Report, (2) legal analysis and reasoning,
(3) legal research, (8) litigation and alternative dispute-resolution procedures, and (10) recognizing
and resolving legal ethical dilemmas. The more general skills are (1) problem solving, (4) factual
investigation, (5) communication, (6) counseling, (7) negotiation, and (9) the organization and
management of legal work. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND
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knowledge and lawyering skills. They bring creativity, common sense, practical
wisdom, and that most precious of all qualities, good judgment.
In this Article, we explore two quite different models of problem solving in
the contexts of everyday life and law practice. We inquire into the nature,
strengths, and limitations of professional expertise, and we touch on the role that
law schools can play in improving lawyers' problem-solving skills. For the reader
who believes that this is rather a lot to bite off in twenty-two pages, this Article is
the basis for an introductory chapter for a larger work in progress-a textbook
entitled Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment.
3
PROBLEM SOLVING
The academic literature contains a variety of definitions of the term
"problem." Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe define a problem as a
situation where "something has gone wrong." 4  However, there are many
situations where nothing has gone wrong, but people must nonetheless make
future-looking decisions where no one option clearly dominates-for example,
decisions about what law school to attend, what job to take, or how to invest
their assets. People often refer to these as "problems." Figuring out how to get
the Apollo 13 astronauts back to earth was a "gone wrong" problem, while the
underlying goal of the Apollo program-putting a man on the moon-involved a
variety of forward-looking problems of design, investment, and organization.
Clients who seek a lawyer's assistance in tax or estate planning or in entering
into a business transaction often have problems of the latter sort. Indeed, the
core of a lawyer's work as a planner involves anticipating problems that might,
but may never in fact, arise.
Thus, we adopt the more inclusive definition suggested by Allen Newell and
Herbert Simon: "A person is confronted with a problem when he wants
something and does not know immediately what series of actions he can perform
to get it." 5 To phrase it even more broadly, a problem is any situation in which
the state of affairs varies, or may in the future vary, from the desired state, and
where there is no obvious way to reach the desired state.6 This definition
3. PAUL BREST & LINDA KREIGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (forthcoming). See infra 36-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
improving problem-solving skills.
4. CHARLES H. KEPNER & BENJAMIN B. TREGOE, THE NEW RATIONAL MANAGER viii (1981).
5. ALLEN NEwELL & HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 72 (1972). They go on to
write:
The desired object may be very tangible (an apple to eat) or abstract (an elegant proof for a
theorem). It may be specific (that particular apple over there) or quite general (something to
appease hunger). It may be a physical object (an apple) or a set of symbols (the proof of a
theorem). The actions involved in obtaining desired objects include physical actions
(walking, reaching, writing), perceptual activities (looking, listening), and purely mental
activities (judging the similarity of two symbols, remembering a scene, and so on).
Id.
6. Along the same lines, Gerald Lopez has suggested that problem solving involves "perceiving
that the world we would like varies from the world as it is and trying to move the world in the desired
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assumes that the person knows just what state of affairs he or she desires.
Sometimes, however, we may have complex or conflicting desires, or goals that
are opaque even to ourselves, and clarifying our goals is an essential part of the
problem-solving process.
Examples from Everyday Life
To explore the concept of problem solving in greater depth, it will be
helpful to refer to a scenario that presents both ordinary everyday problems and
a legal problem (which we'll describe a bit later):
Ned, an associate, and Ellen, an experienced partner, are working
late at the firm, catching up on various projects. Ned asks Ellen if she
would review his decision to file a motion for summary judgment in a
small contract case. Ellen replies: "I haven't eaten all day and I'm
starved. Let's get a bite to eat and talk about it over dinner."
Ned suggests having pizza delivered, but Ellen says, "I think some
fresh air would do us good." Ned mentions a new Italian restaurant
that he's passed on the way to work and that has just announced its
"grand opening." Ellen replies, "I'm tired of the usual places too, but
let's not be guinea pigs."
How will they find a restaurant where they haven't eaten before and
that's known to be OK? After mulling it over a bit, Ned recalls that
he's seen a restaurant guide on the web. He logs on, selects for nearby
restaurants where a meal costs less than $25-he doesn't want his
senior partner to think he's extravagant-and suggests another Italian
restaurant.
"I don't feel like Italian. How about something Asian?" Ellen
responds. At this point Ned realizes and says that he had Continental
cuisine in mind, but Ellen says, "I'd prefer any Asian restaurant."
Ultimately they settle on a California-style restaurant that has some
Asian dishes.
When they return from dinner, Ellen notices that her computer
screen is dark and recalls that she had not saved the file for a brief she
had been working on. "I'll bet the janitors accidentally unplugged the
computer when they swept the floor," says Ned. "That's happened to
me before." Looking at the plug behind the computer, he says "It's
plugged in but it seems a bit loose. I'll jiggle it." As he does so, the
background sound of the hard drive and fan, which they had not
noticed until then, suddenly goes silent. The computer had not been
off before, but it is now-with Ellen's unsaved work gone forever.
Eventually Ellen and Ned figure out that, while they were at dinner,
the janitor had brushed against the monitor switch and flipped it off
while cleaning the screen.
direction." Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 U.C.LA. L REv. 1, 2 (1984). Our only quibble with
this definition is that some problems are best solved, not by changing the external world, but by
changing the inner world of our desires.
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Newell and Simon define the conceptual area between the existing and the
desired state of affairs as the "problem space."7 The problem space includes
(among other things) a number of possible paths, one or more of which-if the
problem is solvable-leads from the initial state to the desired state. In this
simplified representation of the "dead computer" problem, the decision maker
confronts a single decision point, or node, at which he must choose among
different available courses of action:
If the dead computer exemplifies problems of a mechanical nature, Ned and
Ellen's dinner situation is typical of human problems, both because it requires
satisfying multiple interests-each of the actors has several interests that may
compete internally and that certainly compete with the other's-and because it
contains many possible sub-paths:
7. NEWELL & SIMON, supra, at 59-85, 809-34. "Problem space" is a complex concept, embracing
many more components than the possible paths, but for present purposes it suffices to focus on the
paths.
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The initial state is hunger. There are at least three possible main paths
through the problem space, reflecting the options of eating out, ordering in, and
cooking. Each path presents further options, concerning where to eat out, order
in, or cook.8 A solution is a sequence of moves that traverses the problem space
from the initial state of hunger to the desired state of having one's hunger
satisfied.
Of course, the various paths available to Ned and Ellen are not equally
satisfactory. Some are superior to others because they meet objectives besides
satisfying their hunger. From Ellen's point of view, the best solution will satisfy
her culinary preferences (something Asian), her risk aversion ("let's not be
guinea pigs"), and her desire to get out of the office for a while ("some fresh air
would do us good"). From Ned's standpoint, the best solution will satisfy his
own culinary preferences, get him back to work quickly, and not appear to be
extravagant. The ideal solution will satisfy all of Ned's and Ellen's desires or
interests.
9
8. Our representation of the problem, showing the main paths as places to eat and the sub-paths
as types of cuisine (rather than vice versa) is somewhat arbitrary and reflects an assumption about the
actors' ordering of priorities. Also, each sub-path has sub-paths of its own (e.g., what to order from
the menu) that Ned and Ellen must consider before their hunger can be satisfied.
9. We do not address the issues of authority and gender presented by Ned and Ellen's shared
problem. Imagine, however, how their "negotiation" might have concluded had Ned been the partner
and Ellen the associate.
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The (Unimportant) Difference Between Problem Solving and Decision Making
There is considerable overlap between the concepts of problem solving and
decision making. Although the distinction has no normative consequences, the
concepts focus on different aspects of an overall process. The core of problem
solving is understanding, specifying, or diagnosing the problem (knowing that
you are hungry; "knowing" that the computer's power is off). Especially when
the focus of the problem is something that has "gone wrong," problem solving
may require understanding the causes of the problem (why the power is off).
Problem solving also includes considering possible solutions (ordering in; taking
out; kicking the computer). The core of decision making is selecting among and
implementing alternative courses of action (how best to satisfy your hunger;
what steps to take to fix the computer). A "decision" is the component of
problem solving involved in selecting among available paths as one moves within
the problem space from one node to another.
Two Models of Problem Solving and Decision Making
Having described problem solving in terms of the concept of a problem
space, we turn to the question of how people actually navigate that space. The
process can be described in two quite different ways, one that we'll call "formal,"
the other "naturalistic." The formal model consists of essentially these
elements:
10
1. Define the problem (or decision)
2. Identify the relevant interests and objectives
3. Generate a range of plausible solutions or courses of action
(options)
4. Assess the options in terms of the interests or objectives to be
served
5. Select the best course option, all things considered
6. Implement the decision
7. Observe and learn from the outcome of the decision
Though this describes a plausible sequence for solving many problems, the
formal model is as much logical as chronological in nature. For example, while it
always makes sense to define the problem and the interests involved before
generating alternative courses of action, the actual consideration of alternatives
may cast the problem in a different light, elicit new interests, or change one's
views of the priority of the interests involved. Thus, a decision maker may cycle
among the various steps of the process.
The core of the naturalistic approach is a strategy that Gary Klein refers to
as "recognition-primed decision-making."'" According to this view, experience
10. Variations of this model appear throughout the literature. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN,
JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING 4 (3d ed. 1994); MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at
539.
11. GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 17 (1999).
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in the world gives us myriad problem "schemas"-mental maps that allow us
spontaneously and effortlessly to "size up" a situation, see it as an example of a
problem prototype, construe its meaning, and decide what action to take.
12 If
the problem does not have an obvious solution, then, rather than systematically
generate and compare a number of options (as in the formal model), we evaluate
a single plausible option through "mental simulation"-by imagining ourselves
carrying it out.13 If this does not seem to lead to a good outcome, we evaluate
another possible option.
14
In our view, the formal and naturalistic models mark two ends of a
spectrum, and most real-world problem solving incorporates aspects of both.
One's initial "take" on almost any problem is essentially naturalistic. We
approach the problem with an intuitive grasp of its nature and the interests
involved, with hypotheses about its cause, and with corresponding solutions.
The difference in the models lies in where our thought processes go from there-
in how systematically we navigate the problem space.
Had Ned and Ellen followed the formal model in choosing where to eat,
their problem-solving process might have looked something like this: They
would have identified their several objectives, including satisfying their hunger,
advising Ned on a legal issue, taking a break from work, minimizing the
disruption of work, getting a reasonably-priced meal, and satisfying their
culinary preferences. They would have identified alternative courses of action,
including cooking, ordering in, and eating out; specified the pros and cons of
each; and considered how a variety of establishments-Joe's Pizza and Szechwan
Express for take-out; Villa Roma and Sushi Delight for restaurants-would
satisfy their needs.15 Had Ned followed the formal model in solving Ellen's
computer problem, he would have more thoroughly articulated the relevant
interests or objectives (not losing Ellen's unsaved data); taken more care to
specify the nature of the problem (the screen was blank rather than the
computer off); gathered more diagnostic information (the sound of the fan); and
considered a number of (hopefully non-destructive) strategies for remedying the
problem.
In actuality, Ellen's and Ned's decision processes bear more resemblance to
the naturalistic than to the formal model. The recognition of being hungry and
the decision to eat to satisfy one's hunger are paradigms of recognition-primed
decision making, albeit at a very primitive level. Rather than set out the
problem of where or what to eat, or systematically consider alternative solutions,
Ned and Ellen propose and consider solutions sequentially as they come to mind.
For Ned, who has in (the back of his) mind a quick meal that would minimally
12. Id. at 17, 89.
13. lit at 20, 21.
14. Again, in the process of solving the problem, we may change our understanding of the goal
we are pursuing Id. at 122.
15. We'll say more below about the complication that two people's interests must be satisfied.
Note, however, that an analogue to Ned's and Ellen's competing interests may often occur within an
individual decision maker: The same person could both need a break and want to minimize the time
the meal took from work.
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disrupt his work, this implies ordering in. Ellen's rejection of his suggestion
involves a bit of "mental simulation"-imagining how the next hour would
unfold if they ordered in or went out. Ellen and Ned do not consider all of their
interests from the outset; for example, Ned isn't aware of his preference for
Continental cuisine until they begin considering particular restaurants. The
aspect of the decision-making process that most resembles the formal model is
Ned's systematic canvass of restaurants on the web, having specified criteria of
proximity and price in advance. Ned's approach to the computer scenario-
considering only one possible cause and its obvious solution-is also
paradigmatic of recognition-primed decision making: "dark screen means power
off."
The Necessity of Naturalistic Decision Making and its Dangers
The predominance of naturalistic decision making is an inevitable aspect of
the human condition of limited cognitive ability and time-what Herbert Simon
has called the condition of "bounded rationality. '16 In fact, we solve thousands
of little problems and make thousands of decisions every day. Given God-like
cognitive power and infinite time, we could apply the formal model to all of
these actions. But under conditions of bounded rationality, we rely on
naturalistic decision making most of the time. Indeed, we do not think of most
of these as decisions at all; they are something we just "do." Even when we are
self-conscious about decision making and employ something resembling the
formal model, we seldom seek to optimize. This would require taking into
account and ranking every criterion relevant to our satisfaction with the
outcome. Rather, to use Simon's evocative neologism, we "satisfice, 17 opting
for a reasonably good outcome rather than devoting excessive cognitive energy
to seeking the very best.
If employing the formal model takes too much time-more, really, than we
could spend on most decisions-the naturalistic model makes a virtue of
"jumping to conclusions." It offers a degree of efficiency, without which we
could not cope with the myriad problems and decisions we confront daily in our
personal and work lives. However, reliance on mental shortcuts may lead the
naturalistic decision maker to overlook significant aspects of problems and to
consider an impoverished set of potential solutions. For example, naturalistic
processes tend to use information that comes readily to mind. As a consequence,
the decision maker may overvalue dubious information that is vivid or easily
recalled.18 Consider in this regard Ned's proposal of the Italian restaurant, about
which he knows only that he passed it on the way to work and that it was having
16. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957).
17. Id. at 204-05. See also JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41
(1958) (discussing satisfactory versus optimal standards).
18. This is the phenomenon that cognitive psychologists refer to as "availability bias." See
generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 163 (1982) [hereinafter KAHNEMAN ET AL.].
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a "grand opening."
Of course, failing to choose the best restaurant matters little in the larger
scheme of things, so it makes sense for ordinary people (as distinguished from
restaurant reviewers or spying chefs) to allocate relatively few resources to
selecting a restaurant. But as Ned's experience with Ellen's computer
demonstrates, a naturalistic approach to problem solving can lead to serious
errors, which might be avoided through the application of a more systematic,
formal approach. When Ned saw Ellen's darkened computer screen, it triggered
a "dead computer" schema, which included information gleaned from Ned's
prior experiences with malfunctioning computers. Once triggered, this schema
automatically supplied Ned with a definition of the problem (the power is off), a
causal theory (the plug is out), and a solution (jiggle the plug). The approach
supplied by the schema was so compelling that Ned failed to generate or
consider other causal theories and failed to notice evidence inconsistent with the
schema (the sound of the hard disk and fan). In the absence of alternative
hypotheses, engaging in a "mental simulation" of one causal explanation or
course of action frequently leads to overconfidence and to ignoring
disconfirming evidence.1 9 Errors of this sort pervade all problem solving, but are
particularly endemic to naturalistic approaches. Like Ned, the naturalistic
problem solver may structure the problem poorly, err in attributing causation,
overlook relevant interests, and select a familiar, but quite suboptimal, solution.
In the real world, human decision making is a continual intermixture of
naturalistic and formal processes, with the consideration of all interests, options,
and constraints seldom, if ever, being fully pursued. When the stakes are high
and the variables ascertainable, it often makes sense to follow a relatively formal
route. For example, it makes more sense to articulate your criteria and engage
in comparison shopping for a car than for an ice-cream cone. But sometimes,
even though the stakes are high and time is limited, one has no choice but to rely
on recognition-primed, naturalistic decision making. As Justice Holmes
famously remarked in a self-defense case, "[d]etached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."'20 Consider the on-the-spot
decisions demanded of firefighters,21 police officers, and, for that matter, trial
lawyers.
In sum, real-world problem solving and decision making inevitably require
tradeoffs between the importance of the decision, its urgency, and the costs of
engaging in the process. By definition, a good problem-solving process
maximizes the satisfaction of the parties' interests, all things considered,
including the costs of the process itself.
19. See KLEIN, supra note 11, at 65-69 (discussing process of disregarding contradictory
evidence); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in KAHNEMAN ET AL,
supra note 18, at 201 (addressing mental operation of the simulation heuristic).
20. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335,343 (1921).
21. KLEIN, supra note 11, at 7-14.
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PROBLEM SOLVING IN A PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT AND THE NATURE OF
EXPERTISE
How does problem solving in a professional context differ from problem
solving in everyday life?
Let us turn to the legal matter about which Ned sought Ellen's advice.
22
The firm represents Clyde, a computer programmer who has sued Def Records,
a small company that refuses to pay for accounting software he wrote, on the
ground that the software does not do what Clyde said it would. This is one of the
first cases that Ned has been assigned to handle on his own. Yesterday, he
received a phone call from Clyde, who seemed upset that nothing had happened
since the case was filed some months ago, and asked Ned to try to hasten its
resolution.
Based on his knowledge of summary judgment from Civil Procedure, his
reading of the contract (which disclaims any warranty of performance), and his
study of the relevant law concerning warranties, Ned believes that Clyde can win
on summary judgment and proposes to file a motion. After examining the case
file, Ellen, ever the mentor, takes the occasion to introduce Ned to the real world
of litigation and to some basic problem-solving skills.
Ellen explains that while a motion for summary judgment might bring about
a quick disposition of the case, it could have untoward consequences: The judge
before whom the motion will be argued views summary judgment with
considerable skepticism. The defendant's lawyer, a solo practitioner who has not
served any discovery requests in the time the case was filed, probably hasn't
been focusing on the case; but the motion may lead him to take Clyde's
deposition, which could elicit the fact that Clyde made extravagant verbal
representations about the software's performance. Even if those representations
are not formally binding, they may bias the judge further against summary
judgment. Moreover, litigating the motion for summary judgment will cost
almost as much as going to trial. If the motion is denied, Clyde's costs will thus
be doubled. If the motion is granted, Def Records will likely appeal, with
attendant costs and the possibility of still having to incur the time and expense of
trial.23
While the analysis of this case seems pretty clear cut, Ellen explains that it is
sometimes useful to chart such problems using a decision tree. Happily the
restaurant has paper tablecovers and crayons. Ellen sketches the following
diagram, and invites Ned to estimate the probabilities of each event occurring
and the costs of the proceedings:
22. With modifications and an analysis with which he would not necessarily agree, we have
borrowed the example from Gary Blasi's excellent article, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL ED. 313, 321-22 (1995).
23. Id. at 337.
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no
as above]
"I take your point," says Ned. "We'll just wait until the case comes to trial."
"Not so fast," Ellen responds. "Did Clyde give you any indication why he was
upset that the case wasn't progressing? Surely you discussed the time frame with
him at an earlier point." Ned replies that Clyde mentioned that he hoped to use
the funds from the judgment to start a new venture. Ellen asks whether Ned sees
any options beside summary judgment and waiting for trial, and eventually they
1999]
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discuss the pros and cons of approaching Def Records' lawyer with a settlement
overture.
The Mix of Formal and Naturalistic Decision Making
Ellen's and Ned's problem-solving processes here are not essentially
different from the mixture of formal and naturalistic processes they employed in
the restaurant and computer problems. Of course, the lawyers have far more
knowledge about litigation than laypersons, most of whom do not know what a
motion for summary judgment is, let alone how opposing counsel and the judge
might react to the motion under the circumstances. Experts differ from
laypersons not merely in the quantity of detailed knowledge, but in the quality of
its organization.24  They possess domain-specific schemas that describe the
attributes of problems and contain solutions to them. 5 As Gary Blasi writes:
The knowledge of experts is organized in ways that permit the expert
to recognize patterns that are entirely invisible to novices in complex
situations. In routine cases, this organized knowledge permits an
expert merely to match a problem situation to a stored 'problem
schema' and to retrieve from memory the associated solution
procedure. In more complex and uncertain situations, the schematic
knowledge permits experts to construct mental models that capture
much of the complexity of the situation, and to 'run' the mental models
in simulation in order to evaluate the likely consequences of
alternative courses of action.
26
Naturalistic problem solving, under this conception, involves selecting a
schema relevant to the problem at hand and drawing on a solution procedure
suggested by the schema.2 7 Ned's "summary judgment schema" is informed
mainly by appellate decisions he studied in law school. Accordingly, Ned focuses
on a narrow range of doctrinal factors in predicting what would happen if a
motion were filed. By virtue of her many years of experience, Ellen's summary
judgment schema is richer and more nuanced and contains practical as well as
doctrinal knowledge.
Also, rather than accepting the limitations of Ned's structuring of the
problem-"should we file a motion for summary judgment or wait for trial?"-
Ellen broadens the frame of the problem to ask, "given the client's current
objectives, what is the best course of action to take at this time?" This reflects
both good problem solving in terms of the formal model and the fact that her
summary judgment schema is embedded in a larger civil litigation schema, which
includes settlement as well as pre-trial or post-trial judgment as a means by
which clients' cases are brought to conclusion. Thus, she is able to identify
potential solutions that evade Ned.
24. Id at 313.
25. KURT VAN LERN, Problem Solving and Cognitive Skill Acquisition, in FOUNDATIONS OF
COGNITIvE SCIENCE 527,545-46 (Michael I. Posner, ed., 1989).
26. Blasi, supra note 22, at 318.
27. VAN LEHN, supra note 25, at 545-49.
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In analyzing Ned's particular question about summary judgment, Ellen
tacitly assumes that Clyde's interests are to bring the litigation to an expeditious
and successful conclusion while minimizing legal costs. She explicitly assesses
two alternative courses of action (moving for summary judgment and doing
nothing) and concludes that one is manifestly superior to the other. While she
reaches this conclusion intuitively and quickly, she confirms her hypothesis more
systematically by drawing a flow-chart of the options and assigning probabilities
to the outcomes.
In these respects, Ellen's decision making resembles the formal model.
However, each of the factors she considers (e.g., the opposing counsel's and
judge's reactions to the motion) is a problem-solving exercise in itself, which she
approaches largely naturalistically rather than through a sustained process of
inferential reasoning. As Professor Blasi notes, Ellen "does not retrieve all the
myriad irrelevant details of the past cases, but rather the schemas she has
extracted from them all. If these schemas had names, they might carry labels
like 'passive-acting opposing counsel provoked to prepare case."' Ellen's
consideration of the likely success of the motion also involves mental
simulation-imagining what might happen if the judge denied or granted the
motion. The more systematically she considers each of these paths, the more
formal her decision process appears to be.
The Downsides of Naturalistic Decision Making
Experts, as Professor Blasi notes, are "able simply to 'recognize' in the
problem a pattern of a certain kind and to 'retrieve' a solution from a stored
repertoire of solutions to similar problems." 29 Schematic structures enable
experts readily to perceive, sort, and process relevant information, predict
outcomes, and make decisions.3° Yet all of this cognitive firepower comes at a
cost-for any schema, no matter how well developed, necessarily constrains
perception and judgment.31 For example, Ellen's expert schema does not
encompass alternative sources of capital for Clyde's new venture-something
that a more systematic generation of alternative solutions would have included
(and, incidentally, that would likely have been second nature to any of the firm's
transactional lawyers). More generally, the stock situation and responses
embedded in a particular schema may lead a lawyer not to grasp the nuances of a
client's particular story or recognize the client's particular interests. For
example:
28. Blasi, supra note 22, at 355.
29. d.
30. For an overview of schema theory, see generally William F. Brewer & Glenn V. Nakamura,
The Nature and Function of Schemas, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNION 119 (Robert S. Wyer,
Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984), and David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNIrlON 161 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984).
31. For a useful description of the manner in which schemas can distort perception and judgment,
see, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1
SOCIAL COGNITON: THE ONTARIO SYmposiuM 89 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981).
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* A plaintiffs injury lawyer, representing a poor tenant whose child
was injured in a badly-maintained apartment building, negotiates a
good monetary settlement that includes a standard non-disclosure
agreement, not appreciating that the client's role in an informal
tenants' organization and her interest in working with other tenants
to improve conditions make the agreement undesirable and its
breach inevitable.
" The lawyer for a discharged employee demands damages for
emotional distress, thereby opening his client to embarrassing
revelations of a hitherto concealed history of mental illness.
" The lawyer representing a large biotech firm in a negotiation to
acquire a small firm insists that the parties adhere to the industry
practice of putting funds in escrow until both parties have completed
due diligence. The smaller firm is strapped for cash, cannot afford
to investigate the acquirer's representations, and refuses to accept
an onerous condition that would only benefit the acquirer.
Although the acquirer is quite sure of the accuracy of the small
company's representations, the lawyer refuses to deviate from the
norm, and a potentially valuable deal falls through.
We suspect that the instinctual application of expert legal schemas to
clients' varied problems accounts for some of the frustration that clients
experience with their lawyers, and vice versa. Clients who may be deeply
concerned about aspects of a problem that are irrelevant from a strictly legal
point of view may feel that their lawyers aren't paying attention to their real
concerns. Lawyers-especially those being paid on a contingency basis-may
become impatient with clients' long-winded descriptions of legally irrelevant
aspects of their stories, or with their demands for solutions that legal procedures
cannot provide.
32
In sum, though naturalistic decision making plays a valuable, indeed
essential, role in expert problem solving, the process is dangerously incomplete
without some systematic consideration of the interests and options. A central
feature of professional judgment is the ability to blend the naturalistic and
formal processes.
To answer the question with which we began this section, the fundamental
process of problem solving in a professional context is not essentially different
from problem solving in everyday life. The main differences are that lawyers are
32. Whether the very possession of professional expertise inevitably constrains the expert's
understanding of a problem and the range of plausible solutions considered is an interesting question,
to which we have no ready answer. Certainly all professionals are susceptible to "competency bias"-
the tendency to frame and resolve in terms of their area of expertise, a tendency nicely captured by the
quip, "to a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." We began this Article with the observation that
"a client with a problem consults a lawyer rather than, say, a psychologist, investment counselor, or
business advisor because he perceives the problem to have a significant legal dimension." Imagine the
different approaches that these and other professionals might have to the identical problem and,
indeed, how differently they might have defined what the problem was.
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typically involved in a representative role and that they possess professional
expertise. After three years of law school and several years of practice, Ned has
considerable expertise compared to most laypeople. And after a dozen or more
years of practice, Ellen has much more expertise than Ned. But precisely what
does legal expertise comprise? How is it acquired and improved? As
background, consider some vignettes of the tasks that lawyers perform:
* An appellate lawyer seeks to influence the course of legal doctrine
by persuading a court that settled doctrine with respect to race and
sex discrimination forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
* A trial lawyer seeks to discover, organize, and present evidence to
persuade the jury to return a verdict for her client.
" A business lawyer identifies risks involved in a movie deal, including
other parties' incentives to behave strategically, and structures the
transaction so as to mitigate the risks to his client.
" An estate planner assists a client in transferring wealth to her family
and to charitable organizations in ways that are both tax-efficient
and assure that she will have adequate income during her retirement
years.
* A company's general counsel works with its chief operating officer
to develop a procedure for responding to sexual harassment claims
if any should arise, or responds to the crisis occasioned by a
particular accusation of harassment.
* A lawyer for a tenants' organization seeks to persuade a regulatory
agency to tighten standards and enforcement regarding lead paint.
" An environmental lawyer representing a local government agency
negotiates an agreement with neighboring jurisdictions involving the
quality of drinking water in their common watershed.
Lawyers bring different kinds of professional expertise to these diverse
tasks. It is useful to differentiate among (1) knowledge about the law, legal
institutions, and actors; (2) knowledge about particular substantive domains; and
(3) expertise in problem solving as such.
Expertise in Law and Legal Institutions
In the first of these vignettes, the lawyer's task of persuading an appellate
court to extend settled case law to a new area calls for creative problem solving
with respect to both analogical reasoning and advocacy. The task draws on the
skills of doctrinal analysis, legal research, writing, and advocacy-many of which
play a background role in the other tasks as well. The foundations for these
skills are laid in the traditional law school curriculum, which also prepares
students to acquire specialized knowledge of new areas of doctrinal and statutory
law as the need arises during their careers.
The vignettes also highlight other kinds of legal expertise, such as knowing
how to persuade judges, juries, administrative officers, and other actors in the
legal system. The traditional law school curriculum does not address the
psychology of advocacy or prepare graduates to deal with masses of unorganized
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facts, to present factual narratives, or to deal persuasively with various legal
actors other than, perhaps, appellate judges. In view of the uneven mentoring
our graduates receive, we might well do more to lay foundations for acquiring
these skills.
Of course, much knowledge of this sort must be learned on the job. Just
how one acquires expertise from experience is in itself a complex question, which
we only touch upon here.33 The last item in our description of the formal
decision-making process on page 816 is: "Observe and learn from the outcome of
the decision." As Gary Klein writes, experts learn from experience in several
ways:
34
" They engage in reflective practice, so that each opportunity for
practice has a goal and evaluation criterion;
" They compile an extensive experience bank;
* They obtain feedback that is accurate, diagnostic, and reasonably
timely;
" They review experiences to derive new insights and learn from
mistakes.
Learning from experience requires not only monitoring one's decisions, but
avoiding various barriers or traps that hinder acquiring and analyzing relevant
information. These include:
" hindsight bias (the phenomenon of believing that we "knew it all
along" only after an event has occurred);
" absence of feedback from our decisions (consider the difficulty of a
lawyer's assessing the wisdom of advice that a client not do
something);
* over-generalization from scant data, or failing to generalize from
adequate data;
" confirmation bias (seeking evidence that confirms our hypotheses,
but not noticing evidence that would disconfirm them);
* rationalization and resistance to criticism.
In short, while experience is inevitable, learning from experience is not.
Professor Blasi states that Ellen, the experienced lawyer, "has acquired a
significant body of knowledge-about opposing lawyers, about trial judges,
about the likely consequences of certain actions-from her many previous
interactions with other lawyers, other judges."35 It would be more accurate to
say that Ellen has had the opportunity to gain this knowledge. For example,
while her observation about the judge's reception to motions for summary
judgment may well be correct, it may also be based on a few vivid personal
experiences or on settled wisdom with little empirical foundation.
33. See Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decisionmaking, in
KAHNEMAN ET AL, supra note 18, at 268.
34. KLEmN, supra note 11, at 104 (with slight modifications of the text).
35. Blasi, supra note 22, at 355.
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Expertise in Other Substantive Domains
In addition to knowledge of the law and legal institutions, many of the tasks
outlined in the vignettes draw on experience beyond the domain of the law. In
her preventive mode, the general counsel relies on her sense of how
organizations function; and in her crisis prevention mode, she must know how to
deal with the press, the public, and investors as much as with legal actors. The
lawyer advocating for the tenants' organization must not only be familiar with
the relevant administrative and legislative processes and the particular officials
she wishes to persuade. She, and the environmental lawyer as well, must also
have some grasp of the relevant science and technology.
Sometimes, the lawyer's knowledge merely shadows expertise possessed by
others, such as an organization's chief operating officer, accountants, or
engineers. Sometimes, however, the lawyer may have a broader perspective
than his or her clients do--simply by virtue of having encountered analogous
problems in other spheres. For example, over a professional lifetime, a good
transactional lawyer develops a sense for what can go wrong with a deal and how
to guard against it. A lawyer working with administrative agencies and
legislatures develops both general know-how about the processes and knowledge
about the particular officials. An estate planner encounters more and less
successful approaches to meeting her clients' goals.
Problem-Solving Expertise
Finally, we turn to the lawyer's role as counselor, which lies at the core of
the lawyer-client relationship, and which typically calls for problem-solving skills.
Problem solving inevitably begins with an understanding of the interests at stake,
but (in the absence of ethical dilemmas) it is the client's interests and not the
lawyer's that govern. Thus, an essential aspect of the lawyer's role is to work
with clients to identify and clarify their interests. In the foregoing vignettes, the
counseling function is most evident in the estate planning scenario, but it is
implicit in almost all of the examples-for decisions to litigate, lobby, or enter
into transactions, all revolve around the clients' interests.
There are situations where clients not only fully comprehend their own
interests, but have already engaged in whatever problem solving is required and
have determined what actions to take. The lawyer's sole task here is to
implement the decision. In most situations, however, the lawyer acts as the
client's interlocutor, partner, or guide in identifying and clarifying objectives and
determining the best course of action. The very dynamics of a good counseling
relationship, including the ongoing dialogue between lawyer and client, conduce
to an explicit consideration of interests and options, and tend toward a relatively
formal decision-making process.
36
Problem-solving skills can be learned in academic settings as well as on the
job. We believe-though we cannot be certain-that developing the systematic
habits of thought inherent in the formal model improves subsequent problem
36. KLEIN, supra note 11, at 95-96.
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solving done at the naturalistic end of the spectrum. We are attracted by the
analogy in Constantin Stanislavski's description of an actor's preparation:
One cannot always create subconsciously and with inspiration. No
such genius exists in the world. Therefore our art teaches us first of all
to create consciously and rightly, because that will best prepare the
way for the blossoming of the subconscious, which is inspiration. The
more you have of conscious creative moments in your role, the more
chance you will have of a flow of inspiration.
3 7
The core of the traditional law school curriculum-the analysis of appellate
cases-focuses on problem solving in an essential legal domain, and arguably
provides foundations for problem solving more broadly.38 Beyond the core,
many law schools offer clinical courses in negotiation and a number are
experimenting with courses that focus on a range of problem-solving skills.
NYU Law School's Lawyering Program, our course in "Problem Solving,
Decision Making, and Professional Judgment," and others like them, 39 rely on a
combination of readings, writing exercises, simulations, and situational case
studies.4° Our own course combines what might be termed positive and negative
approaches to problem solving. On the positive side, it offers students
opportunities to experience and reflect on "conscious creative moments" in a
variety of lawyering roles. On the negative or cautionary side, it surveys
cognitive, social, and motivational phenomena that impede people's perception
of the external world,41 their understanding and pursuit of their own goals, and
the limitations of professional expertise. Ideally, these two approaches to
learning come together in simulated exercises, where students engage in creative
problem solving and make and learn from mistakes.
A Note on Problem Solving with Multiple Decision Makers and Multiple Interests
Most of the preceding discussion has focused on situations where only one
37. CONSTANTN STANISLAVSKI, AN ACTOR PREPARES 14 (Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood trans.,
Theatre Arts Books 1948).
3& See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REv. 527,
529-32 (1994) (discussing lawyers' role in society); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L REV. 77 (1997)
(discussing lawyers' role in settlements).
39. E.g., Judith Areen, Judgment and Decision Making Seminar, Georgetown School of Law.
40. These are case studies of the sort traditionally used in business schools that present more or
less rich descriptions or scenarios of problems as a client might present them, and challenge law
students to identify, analyze, and propose solutions to them.
41. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN ET AL, supra note 18, passim (discussing effect of cognitive biases);
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE passim (3d ed. 1993) (discussing effect of
social influence); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342-44 (1984) (discussing psychological process involved in making choices in
risky and riskless contexts); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268-69 (1979) (discussing effects of risk on decision
making); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.
Bus. S251, S257-S260 (1986) (same); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453,453-55 (1981) (same).
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person's interests are in the foreground. However, as Ned's and Ellen's dinner
problem indicates, problem solving often requires identifying, eliciting, and
reconciling multiple competing or conflicting interests. One or more people may
engage in problem solving or decision making, and the actor may be concerned
with only his own interests or with the interests of others as well. Consider these
questions facing the guests at a restaurant.
Unitary Interest Multiple Interests
Individual Decision Shall I have cream in What wine shall I
Maker my coffee? order for the table?
Multiple Decision How can we get the How shall we divide
Makers waiter's attention? the check?
Unitary Interest/Individual Decision Maker. "Shall I have cream in my
coffee?" is the paradigmatic case of individual decision making. While the
individual may have to reconcile competing interests-she loves cream, but is
trying to reduce cholesterol-the dynamics are purely intrapersonal. This
category also includes a decision by an agent who is solely concerned with his
principal's interests-for example, a parent ordering dinner for his young child.
Ideally, this describes a lawyer's decision making on behalf of a client with
respect to matters that do not call for consultation.42 Putting aside the crucial
question of how one determines another's interests, this situation is not
conceptually different from that of an individual decision maker considering only
his own interests.
Unitary Interest/Multiple Decision Makers. In asking, "How can we get the
waiter's attention?" there are no conflicts of interest-everyone has the same
interest in getting served or getting the check. Collaborative decision making
can improve the process by generating more ideas. However, the presence of
multiple decision makers can also impair the process by consuming too much
time or through a dynamic-sometimes called "groupthink" 43 -that inhibits the
rational consideration of alternatives. Though one would hope that the lawyer-
42. For a useful discussion of when consultation is not required, see DAVID A. BINDER ET AL,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH 266-70 (1991).
43. See generally IRVING L JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROuTrHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1983).
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client counseling relationship improves decision making, it is not immune from
this dynamic.
Multiple Interests/Individual Decision Maker. The person delegated to
decide "what wine to order for the table" may like red, while her friends prefer
white. Agents commonly find themselves in the position of representing others,
but having interests of their own that are not entirely aligned with those of the
principals. For example, the lawyer's commitment to serving her client's
interests may compete with her own financial or reputational interests.
44
Multiple Interests/Multiple Decision Makers. "How shall we divide the
check?" is a problem confronting multiple participants whose interests are not
entirely congruent. Like Ned's and Ellen's decision about where to have dinner,
this exemplifies one end of the spectrum: The divergences are small and the
stakes low-especially when compared to the importance of the underlying
relationships. At the other end of the spectrum lies a negotiation involving the
bitter break-up of a business or personal relationship.
The question of how the participants should approach such disputes has
received considerable academic attention in recent years, with an increasing
number of scholars and practitioners advocating what they call a "problem-
solving" approach to negotiation. In a seminal article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow
proposed both process and outcome criteria for evaluating a negotiation. 45 The
former includes the search for Pareto-optimal solutions, the minimization of
transaction costs, and appropriate client participation. The latter includes an
outcome that reflects both parties' "'real' needs, goals, and objectives, in both
the short and long term,"46 including whatever ongoing relationship they desire
and a solution that is fair and lasting. More recently, Robert Mnookin and his
coauthors have described the central activities of "problem-solving negotiation"
as searching "for value-creating trades that can make one or both parties better
off"47 and "managing the tension between creating and distributing value."48
The core commonality of problem solving in all of the situations described
above is its basis in the parties' interests.49 Writers thus distinguish an interest-
based or problem-solving approach to negotiation ("Let's see if we can satisfy
44. William F. Coyne, Jr. writes: "[T]here are significant incentives for lawyers not to embrace
early settlement. These incentives include the need to market services, the desire not to appear weak,
the obligation to represent a client zealously, the thirst for justice, and last, but perhaps not least, the
desire to maximize income." William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO. ST. J.
ON DiSP. RESOL. 367,369 (1999).
45. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754,760-61 (1984).
46. Id. at 760.
47. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: How LAwYERs HELP CLIENTs
CREATE VALUE IN NEGOTIATION 11 (forthcoming).
48. Id. at 29.
49. Thus, Leonard Riskin uses "problem solver" to denote "a lawyer who focuses on the client's
interests as well as legal entitlements, and who can select (with the client) and carry out the most
appropriate methods for pursuing those interests." Leonard Riskin, A Response to Professor Pipkin,
50 FLA. L. REv. 757,757-58 (1998).
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both of our culinary tastes") from one that views negotiation exclusively in
positional or distributive terms ("I want Italian, you want Asian, and I'm going
to do whatever I can to have my way"). An interest-based or problem-solving
approach begins with each participant identifying his own interests and those of
the other person. It is less a specific technique than a mindset that searches for
common ground. 0
Not to identify one's own interests would not be sensible problem solving
under any circumstances. Not to identify the other person's interests would
forego opportunities for a relatively efficient and non-contentious negotiation,
for a solution advantageous to oneself or that accommodated both parties'
interests, or possibly any solution at all. (For example, if Ned were indifferent to
Ellen's desire for Asian cuisine, he might continue insisting on continental
restaurants until Ellen got angry or frustrated, which Ned doesn't want).
Problem-solving negotiation presumes that, unless considerations of fairness
dictate otherwise, a Pareto-optimal solution-where one party can be made
better off without the other being worse off in any way-is desirable, and that it
is at least sometimes desirable to accommodate the other party's interests even if
one might not end up quite as well off. (Ned might have succeeded in inducing
Ellen to dine at a Continental restaurant, when he could be entirely or
substantially satisfied with pasta at the California-style restaurant.)
Is SOCIETY BETTER OFF WITH PROBLEM-SOLVING LAWYERS?
"Problem solver" is a term of approbation in our culture, and it is not
surprising that lawyers find the characterization appealing. A problem-solving
approach to conflict resolution is especially attractive in a society concerned
about the high costs of litigation. Yet it is useful-indeed, an element of good
problem solving-to approach the obvious with a bit of skepticism. After all,
motherhood and apple pie were once treated as archetypal goods. Yet the world
is overpopulated, the duties of childcare compete with women's success in the
workplace, and lard clogs the arteries.
While we do not see any real downsides to the idea of lawyers as problem
solvers, we would like to express two cautions. First, lawyers who think they are
more skillful problem solvers than they actually are, or who are overly impressed
with their comparative expertise, may lure or press their clients into poor
decision processes with bad outcomes. Second, being a good problem solver
does not obviate the moral complexities of legal representation. The best
interests of the client are not necessarily those of society at large, and even the
brilliantly negotiated, "win-win" solution to a multiparty dispute may inflict
harm on non-parties. On the flip side, the lawyer who views herself as "counsel
50. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., forthcoming 2000). For an excellent survey of practical approaches to achieving
agreement in situations involving multiple participants with multiple interests, see generally THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT
(Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (addressing ideal practices in consensus-building).
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to the situation,"5 1 rather than her clients, may deprive the clients of the
unqualified commitment they have reason to expect.
This said, however, the aspiration of lawyers to be problem solvers seems
unequivocally good. Many lawyers are already quite successful in this enterprise.
Their task, and the task of legal educators, is to disseminate their knowledge-
and their aspirations-to others in or entering the profession.
51. Lawrence Sitzmann et al., Counsel for the Situation: Conflict and Ethical Issues in
Representing the Family Business Client, 17 ALI-ABA 113 (1998) (quoting Justice Brandeis).
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